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TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS:*
SUPERVISION, REGULATION, OR WHAT?
SEYMOUR J. RUBIN**
It has been a commonplace of the 1960's and early 1970's that
the multinational enterprise, however defined,' has dramatically
altered international economic relationships. One sees this altera-
tion in accordance with one's own preoccupations and perceptions,
though almost all agree that it has been large and important.
Most statesmen and theorists of the developing world find sig-
nificance in the fact that the gross annual sales of General Motors
exceed the gross national product of many nation-states in the
world.2 The combination of size of different sorts, equated with
power, and the largely foreign ownership and direction of the
majority of multinationals leads to the conclusion that a conflict
exists with the policies of the nation-state. For U.S. labor unions,
the MNC is a mechanism which has shifted U.S. jobs and tech-
nology abroad, in the interest of its own profits and with increas-
ing prejudice to a free and prosperous labor movement.3 For
many in the Congress and the U.S. press, the MNC is a means
of imposing private- purpose often by improper methods, on
United States governmental policy.
An extreme example of the asserted influence of the trans-
national on governmental policy is the asserted involvement of
*Throughout this article, the terms multinational enterprise (MNE), multinational cor-
poration (MNC), and/or transnational corporation (TNC), are used with varying degrees
of frequency. Perhaps this is the author's view of the unimportance, and indeed, the almost
scholastic nature of the numerous discussions of definition. What is meant, by whatever
term, is a corporation with its ownership and its control centered for the most part in one
nation (the "home" nation) and with several operating subsidiaries, owned in whole or in
part, but used as parts of an integrated industrial enterprise, in other nations. The term
most in current favor, and now adopted in the United Nations, is "transnational corpora-
tion." The argument may plausibly be made that "transnational" conveys the meaning
better than "multinational," which may connote multi-nation ownership. On the other hand,
the term "corporation" seems too narrow, since many enterprises which have similar effects
are brought about by agreement rather than stock ownership; and state trading companies
are often not corporations.
*.Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University; Member, Inter-
American Juridical Committee; United States Representative, First Session of United Na-
tions Commission on Transnational Corporations, March, 1975. The views expressed in this
article are entirely those of the author, and should in no way be taken as necessarily re-
flecting those of any private, public or intergovernmental organization.
' A definition of the multinational corporation acceptable to all will probably never be
had, but generally, see U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, IMPLICATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS
FOR WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT AND FOR U.S. TRADE AND LABOR 80-84 (TC Publication
No. 537, 1973), UN ECOSOC, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1
(1974), and Aharoni, On the Definition of a Multinational Corporation, 11 Q.Rev.Econ.
27 (1971).
2 E.g., General Motors' gross annual sales for 1969 exceeded the combined GNP of Vene-
zuela, Chile and Peru for 1970. For such an exercise in ranking of countries and com-
panies, see Hearings on Multinational Corporations Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of
the Senate Finance Comm., 93rd Cong., Ist Sess., at 404 (1973).
3 U.S. labor unions have voiced concern over the domestic effects of the MNC. See U.S.
MULTINATIONALS, THE DIMMING OF AMERICA, Report Prepared for the AFL-CIO Maritime
Trades Department Executive Board Meeting in Hearings, supra note 2, at 445, Testimony
of Paul Jennings, Pres., Int'l Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, in Hearings
on a Foreign Economic Policy for the 70's Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic
Policy of the Joint Economic Comm.. 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 813 (1970), and Testimony
of I. W. Abel, Pres., Int'l Steelworkers Union in Hearings on the Trade Reform Act of
1973 Before the House Ways & Means Comm., 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 1209 (1973). For
the contrary view, see Tariff Commission Report, supra note 1, at £45.
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ITI in Chilean politics, and its interface with official American
policy. It has been more than suggested that, in that case and
perhaps in others, the existence abroad of an American invest-
ment is a determinant of policy. 4 Even the guaranteeing by the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) of certain
types of overseas investments in the developing nations .has been
thought to involve a predetermination by private interests of
overall governmental attitudes.
Attitudes vary, even among those who regard the transna-
tional corporation as a superpower capable of transcending nar-
row nationalistic policies in the interest of a dispassionate and
useful pursuit of global efficiency. Some, like Arnold Toynbee,
regard this power as the beneficent instrument of overcoming a
nationalism which must be eliminated if the world is to survive. 5
Others, like Ronald Miller, view it as the instrument of impos-
ing and then perpetuating a division of benefits which impover-
ishes the less developed and widens the disparities between rich
and poor in those nations.6 One may find any of these views, in
varying degrees of moderation, expressed in the voluminous
literature, and in the resolutions of innumerable international
bodies. There is even the skeptical view that the power of the
large international corporations may have been somewhat exag-
gerated.
7
A substantial part of this abundant literature suggests that
some form of international regulation of the multinational is
desirable, if not necessary. A plethora of international organiza-
tions already have the creature under dissection. These range
from the OECD" to the Inter-American Juridical Committee of
the OAS 9 to the United Nations to the ILO1 to the United Na-
4 The alleged involvement of the U.S. government with ITT in Chile occurred on several
levels. The full extent of the relationships is not yet known but is one subject of inquiry
before the Rockefeller Commission. See Hearings on the International Telephone and Tele-
graph Co. and Chile Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm., 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., (1973), and A. SAMPSON, THE SOVEREIGN
STATE OF ITT (1973).
5 A. TOYNBEE, THE RELUCTANT DEATH OF SOVEREIGNTY (1971).
"See Muller, Poverty is the Product, FOREIGN POLICY (No. 13, Winter 1973-74) 71, 85-88.
7See Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Trananational Law. 83
HARV. L. Rgv. 739, at 791 (1970); Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sover-
eignty: A Skeptic's Analysis, 3 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 1 (1971).
aSee OECD, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS (1973). The
OECD is, as of mid-May, 1975, engaged in an intensive effort to draft a code of conduct
for TNCs, and related documents, such as the U.S.-sponsored commitment to "national
treatment." The relevant documents are as yet "restricted to participants."
sSee General Secretariat of the OAS, Work Accomplished by the Inter-American Juridical
Committee during its Regular Meeting Held from Jan. 14 to Feb. 20, 1974, at 120-126, OAS
Doe. CJI OEA/Ser. Q/IV.8 CJI-19 (1974). The Permanent Council of the OAS has also
approved a report submitted to it. Report by the General Committee on the Study of
Resolution AG/RES. 167(IV-O/74) "Transnational Enterprises," OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G
CP/Doc. 348/74 rev. 1 (1974), calling for a "research program" on the effects of MNCs
on Latin American economies and on international relations, Summary of the Regular Meet-
ing held by the Permanent Council on September 4. 1974, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G CP/SA.
131/74 (1974).
0 The International Labor Office has undertaken studies on MNCs to provide guidance to
governments in social policy formulation and to determine the advisability of "international
principles and guidelines in the field of social policy relating to the activities of multina-
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tions Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)" to
doubtless many others. International conferences of every sort
12
have dealt with the implications of the multinational for the dis-
tribution of goods and services among and within nations, the
problems of scarcities of food and raw materials, the transfer of
technology, and the effects of multinationals on traditional trade
theory, and, implicitly, on the relevance of such venerable fea-
tures of the international landscape as the GATT. Though con-
siderable skepticism has been expressed as to the utility and
indeed the likely effects of an international supervisory or regu-
latory agency, as for example at the 1973 Dusseldorf Confer-
ence,13 the majority view seems to be that some sort of regulation
or supervision would be desirable.
At the outset, it is useful to know what is being discussed.
Unfortunately, the words often cloud rather than reveal the in-
tention. There is, for example, already much "international"
agreement and regulation pursuant to such agreement. However,
it is generally confined to nations which are on one side of a
rather ill-defined controversy-the developing or capital-import-
ing nations or to those which have the ability, because of special
circumstances, to impose their mandate. Thus, the Andean Group
has its agreement in Decision 24 of the Andean Private Invest-
ment Code, ' an agreement sufficiently strong that the Group was
able to compel Chile to revise laws indicating more receptivity to
foreign enterprise than was thought by the Group to be com-
patible with Decision 24. The OPEC nations have their regula-
tory pact, for reasons too well-known to require elaboration. 1" In
addition, it could probably be argued that there is agreement at
the United Nations-and more to come-expressed in a whole
series of General Assembly resolutions commencing in the late
1950's on the subject of "permanent sovereignty" over natural
tional enterprises .... " International Labor Office, 56 OFICIAL BULLETIN 72 (1973). See
also Statement of F. Blanchard, ILO Director General, at the Regional Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, held at the OECD, Paris, January 7-9, 1975
(unpublished).
IUNCITRAL ha-, r,q..ted the Secretary General to collect information from member
states and produce a report on what measures UNCITRAL should take with regard to
MNCs, 28 GAOR Supp. 17, at 24, U.N. Doe. A/9017 (1973) and 29 GAOR Supp. 17, at 20.
U.N. Doe. A/9617 (1974).
'2 E.g.. Third International Congress on Food, Science and Technology, N.Y. Times, Aug.
11. 1970, at 22, col. 5, 1974 Conference on Food and Energy, Id., May 13, 1974, at 11, col. 1,
World Food Conference, Id., Nov. 17, 1974, at 1, col. 8, and the Third UNCTAD Conference,
UNCTAD, 3rd Session, Official Records, 1st Comm., Summary Records of the 1st to the 22nd
Meetings Held at Santiago, Chile, from Apr. 13 to May 16, 1972, U.N. Doe. TD/III/C.1/
SR.l-22 (1972); 2nd Comm., Summary Records of the 1st to the 19th Meetings, U.N. Doe.
TD/IU/C.2/SR.1-19 (1972); and 3rd Comm., Summary Records of the lst to the 24th
Meetings, U.N. Doe. TD/III/C.3/SR.1-24 (1972).
Is INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT, THE DUSSELDORF CONFERENCE ON MULTINA-
TIONAL COsPORATIONS, 1973 (D. Wallace & H. Ruof eds. 1974).
14 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 152 (1971). See generally, Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment
Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66
Am. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972).
lSee Statute of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 4 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 1175 (1965).
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resources. The General Assembly Resolution on Recommenda-
tions Concerning International Respect for the Rights of Peoples
and Nations to Self-Determination1 6 established a Permanent
Sovereignty Commission which proposed a Resolution on Per-
manent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 17 The Economic and
Social Council adopted a Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources of Developing Countries in 1973.13
The Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States has now
been adopted by the General Assembly in a form acceptable to a
majority but not to a small, but vital, minority of its members."'
Thus, there is no lack of international agreement among the
developing nations in the United Nations and its subsidiary
bodies or in separate forums. There is even supervisory machin-
ery, as for example in the Andean Pact nations.20 Moreover, one
might add the work of the EEC or the tentative steps being taken
by the OECD to the list of proposed agreements coupled with
supervisory agencies. 2' The deficiency, however, is in either
agreements or in supervisory mechanisms which would bring to-
gether the developed and the developing worlds. The General
Assembly may adopt its resolutions, but such accommodation as
has occurred seems due more to changes in economic circum-
stances than adherence to those resolutions.
Certain ambiguities make the task of achieving consensus on
meaningful measures easier in form than in substance. A funda-
mental blurring often occurs in discussion of establishment of
some sort of supervisory apparatus and of the rules, standards,
or even regulations to be applied in such supervision. Thus, the
U.N. Report of the Eminent Persons22 suggested that an agency s3
be set up within the parameters of the United Nations. At the
date of this writing, the U.N. Commission on Transnational Cor-
porations, which resulted, has had its first annual meeting; but
the manner in which it will operate, and how it will deal with
20 G.A. Res. 1314, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18. at 27, U.N. Doc. A/4093 (1958).
27 G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doe. A/5217 (1962).
IsECOSOC Res. 1737, 54 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 1, U.N. Doe. E/5367 (1973).
'929 U.N. GAOR 3281, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974). also in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 251
(1975). The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was approved by 120 votes
to 6 votes against (Belgium, Denmark, German Federal Republic, Luxembourg, U.K. and
U.S.) with 10 abstentions (Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The
Netherlands, Norway and Spain).
" See Agreement Establishing the Andean Development Corporation, 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
940 (1969) and Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration. Id. at 910.
2Such an agreement was proposed, for example, in Goldberg and Kindleberger, Toward
a GATT for Investment: A Proposal for Supervision of the International Corporation, 2
LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 295 (1970). The article proposes the establishment of a panel of
experts which would study the MNC with the aim of formulating regulatory principles. The
recently created UN Commission on Transnational Corporations is such an organization,
reflecting at least some measure of international agreement. See infra notes 23 & 88 and
accompanying text.
" REPORT OF THE GROUP o0 EMINENT PERSONS To STUDY THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. I
ST/ESA/fi (1974), hereinafter cited as Eminent Persons Report.
"The Commission on Transnational Corporations was created as an advisory body to the
ECOSOC by ECOSOC Res. 1913 (LVII), U.N. Doc. E/RES/1913 (LVII) (1974).
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substantive issues, are still far from clear. It has prepared an
awesome agenda for the new Information and Research Center
which has still to be funded or given a Director. It has given
priority to working towards a "Code of Conduct," though the
scope of such a Code remains to be defined, as do the methods by
which it might be achieved. A distinguished Latin American
scholar, Francisco Orrego Vicuna, states that "everything indi-
cates that the tendency is directed toward regional and interna-
tional forms of control. ' 2, A wide variety of supervisory or regu-
latory proposals competes intermittently for attention in forums
as various as the Working Group of the meeting of Foreign Min-
isters of the American Republics or sessions of the American
Assembly.
The full extent of proposals for international supervision or
regulation is unclear. Indeed, there may be considerable conflict
among proponents of such supervision, or of agreements with
respect to the conduct of enterprises or states, as to the purposes
of such supervision and such agreements. The view was ex-
pressed, for example, by a distinguished student of the subject
of multinationals that "the managers of most multinational en-
terprises" would likely "heartily subscribe to (the) suggestion
of international agreements . . . In this way they would be as-
sured of equitable treatment .... ,,25 It is hardly likely that the
agreements which these managers would welcome are identical
with that "General Agreement on Multinational Corporations"
which is stated as an ultimate objective by the United Nations
Group of Eminent Persons. This suspicion is supported by the
several dissents to the Eminent Persons' report by members of
that group, and by the generally unfavorable reception riven to
the cepurL oy managers oi inuitinationals.2 6 Thus, the National
Association of Manufacturers' press release of June 10, 1974, fol-
lowing on the heels of release of the Eminent Persons' recom-
mendations, features in its opening paragraph the statement that
"the U.N. report presents an unbalanced picture of the multina-
cnration's role in internatiu4z development.1 27
The history of attempts to achieve either general-or even
limited-agreements, and to establish supervisory, if not regu-
latory. international mechanisms is one of abject and dismal
failure. Neither the capital exporting nor the capital importing
24 Orrego Vicuna, El Control de la Empresas Multinacionales. 14 FoRo INTERNACIONAL
(No. 1. 1973).
=Statement of Robert Stobaugh in Hearings on a Foreign Economic Policy for the 70's
Before the Svbromnm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Comm.. 91st
Cong., 2d Seas., at 874 (1970).
"1 E.g.. comments by Ryutaro Komiya, J. Irwin Miller & Hans Schaffner, Eminent Per-
sons Report, supra note 22, at 118-161.
21 On this and other comments on the Eminent Persons Report, see Jones, A Panel to
Oversee Multinational Companies is Urged. N.Y. Times, Jun. 10, 1974, at 47, col. 4.
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nations (a classification which roughly, but far from exactly,
corresponds to that of developed and developing nations) seem
willing to accept the proposals of the other, or even of interna-
tional bodies. The fate of the proposed Charter of the Interna-
tional Trade Organization was at least partially attributable to
the unacceptability to either side of its "code of conduct" sec-
tions. 28 Private proposals, such as those sponsored some years ago
by Messrs. Abs and Shawcross, 9 have fallen on barren soil, as
have the various proposals, suggestions, drafts, etc. floated over
the course of the years by such organizations as the National
Foreign Trade Council or the International Chamber of Com-
merce, which latter organization has sought to overcome opposi-
tion by labeling its product as "principles".30 The suggestions of
the OECD in the mid-1960's had little success.3 1 On the other
side, numerous resolutions of the United Nations or of its several
constituent organs have asserted principles whose acceptability
either to multinationals, or to private foreign direct investors, or
to capital exporting nations, is not noticeably affected by the ma-
jorities attained in favor of such resolutions. On this subject, the
history of the years since 1948, when the ITO aborted, has been
one of a dialogue of the deaf. The search for broad consensus on
an international agreement, dealing generally with the conduct
of multinationals, and presumably entrusted for supervision to
some agreed international organization, seems likely to produce
much the same, but perhaps exacerbated, frustration. For these
reasons, the suggestions of Messrs. Goldberg and Kindleberger of
a "GATT for Investment",3 2 which have obtained much support,
are not likely to produce an "Agreement," (the heart of the
GATT), which could be administered by even such makeshift if
2 See W. Diebold, The End of the ITO (Essays in International Finance No. 16, 1952).
On the various U.S. responses to the ITO, see generally, Hearings on Membership and Par-
ticipation by the United States in the ITO before the House Foreign Affairs Comm.. 81st
Cong.. 2d Sess. (1950).
"a The British statesman, Lord Shaweross, and Hermann Abs, former chairman of the
Deutsche Bank, jointly submitted a draft multilateral convention designed to reaffirm cus-
tomary rules of international law in the area of nationalization and to provide for arbi-
tration in such situations. Although not itself endorsed, the Abs-Shawcross proposal con-
tributed to the formulation of the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of
Foreign Property, infra note 31. Both men had individually suggested similar international
agreements a decade earlier; see Abs, Free Enterprise and International Protection of Pri-
vateInterests, 22 VITAL SPEECHES 530 (1956) and Shaweross, Private Capital Abroad, The
Times (London), Dec. 8, 1958, at 11, col. 6.
" The International Chamber of Commerce, e.g., placed its support squarely behind the
1955 proposal of the 9th Session of the GATT Contracting Parties for the creation of an
Organization for Trade Cooperation as an effective institutional replacement for the still-
born ITO - the OTC also failed to achieve ratification, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COX-
MERCE, STATEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE 16TH CONGRESS (Brochure No. 186. 1957). On
the OTC, see Bronz, An International Trade Organization: The Second Attempt, 69 HARe.
L. REV. 440 (1956).
31OECD, DRAFT DOUBLE CONVENTION ON TAXES, INCOME AND CAPITAL (1963). also in
OECD, DOUBLE TAXATION OF INCOME AND CAPITAL, REVISED TEXTS OF THE 1963 OECD
DRAFT CONVENTION AND OF THE COMMENTARY THEREON (1974); OECD, DRAFT CONVENTION
ON THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY (1967), also in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 117 (1968):
and OECD, REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE
CORPORATION (1965).
I-'Supra note 21.
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ingenious device as constructing an organization out of the term
"Contracting Parties", as had to be done when the ITO Charter
was rejected. Nonetheless, in seeming disregard of this experi-
ence, or perhaps on the theory that because something ought to
be done it will be done (a dubious proposition), Professor E.V.D.
Rostow has suggested, that a multilateral treaty ought be
negotiated "capable of accomplishing for the world economy what
modern corporation laws have accomplished for national econo-
mies.133 The aim is stated to be "a code of law to govern... activi-
ties in accordance with agreed principles, which should protect
the interest of both the corporation and of the host countries. '34
The difficulty may lie in seeking solutions without a sufficiently
clear concept of exactly what is the problem to which the solution
is to apply. In a field as heavily worked over as is this, it is un-
doubtedly presumptuous to suggest that there has been a certain
neglect of this definitional prerequisite. Yet one cannot help but
be struck by the prevalence of reference to "the problem" of "the
multinational corporation", or, as current fashion now decrees,
the "transnational" enterprise. There tends, for example, to be a
blurring of the lines between that old and traditional subject of
international discord, protection of foreign direct investment,
with its implications of "prompt, adequate and effective" on the
one side and the Calvo doctrine on the other-and the related but
essentially different issue of the effect of the growth of business
enterprises across national boundaries on such matters as alloca-
tion of production facilities, or on traditional Ricardian concepts
of comparative advantage in international trade.
I.
A lew definitional distinctions may contribute to the search for
solutions.
-A-
The term "multinational" or "transnational" enterprise brings
to the mind of different observers the concept of quite different
" Rostow. Nye & Ball, The Need for International Arrangements, in GLOBAL COMPANIES,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD BUSINESS 156-173, at 157 & 170 (G. Ball ed. 1975).
34 Id. at 158. It may be noted that whatever have been the accomplishments of modern
corporations in the national economy, they have not been based on a national corporate
"code of law." Thus, Incorporation Law in the United States, which would bring under one
federal corporation statute all large American corporations, is based on precisely the
opposite factual analysis - i.e., that American corporations pick and choose (generally
lighting on Delaware) among the 50-odd corporations statutes of the United States. It has
been doubted that a Federal Incorporation Law would come close to accomplishing the aims
of its sponsors. For the pro-Federal incorporation view, see CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA.
(Nader & Green eds. 1973): for the contrasting view, see Friedman, The Social Responsi-
bility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sep. 13, 1970 § VI, at 32; for an
excellent analysis of Federal chartering, see Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations,
61 G'o. L. J. 71 (1972): for a summary (and the view that neither Federal nor interna-
tional chartering would accomplish much), see Rubin, Corporations and Society: The
Remedy of Federal and International Chartering. 23 AM.U.L.R. 263 (1973).
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entities. Even if one is able to arrive at a widely accepted struc-
tural definition (i.e., a multinational is a corporation having at
least five separate foreign producing subsidiaries, or is a cor-
poration in which ownership is multinational, or whatever), one
is still faced with the fact that the companies which operate
across national boundaries, and have domestic economic effects
more or less dictated from abroad do quite different things. How
the different kinds of enterprises operate is basic to rational con-
sideration of the problem of supervision or regulation.
Professor Jack Behrman has suggested some useful if, to this
writer's mind, unnecessarily rigid structural definitions. He sug-
gests that the classic form is that of the investment abroad made
to serve the needs of the parent company for materials, or to
provide it with a foreign market through distribution facilities.
The extractive industries such as Kennecott Copper, or a distri-
bution network, such as Toyota automobiles in the United States
are illustrations. A second category is that of an industrial or
business investment in the host nation designed to serve that
nation's market; production of Ford automobiles in England, or
establishment of a Sears Roebuck chain of stores, are examples.
A third would be the entity which has a global view of the mar-
ket, and which can, generally for rather special reasons, serve its
market from any one of a number of national locations.
It is in this last category that the issues deriving from the
vaunted "flexibility" of the multinational arise. One mines copper
or bauxite where it is found. There may be problems of proper
and fair pricing, or of a host state taking properties from foreign
nationals, or altering the contractual arrangements on which for-
eign nationals have made their initial exploratory expenditures;
but, except in the situation of a broad geographic distribution
available at a competitive price, or of alternative products at
such a price, the foreign investor is immobilized. On the other
hand, transistors can be produced anywhere where there is ma-
chinery and reasonably trainable labor. The engine for a Ford
Pinto can be produced in the United States, England or Germany.
If there is a strike in England, the world market may be supply-
able from another location.
Relevant supervision will therefore differ. Since 1962 the
United Nations has been officially on record that a different
regime exists for products extracted than for products manufac-
tured. Just what can be done with asserted permanent sover-
eignty obviously depends largely on other than U.N. resolutions
or other legal considerations. There is no less national sover-
eignty over a shoe manufacturing plant in Brazil than an iron
ore mine in Venezuela, but reason may dictate different kinds
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of treatment of the foreign investment in the two situations.
Neither of these situations is the same as that of a multinational
which has the flexibility to produce where it will within limits
and where it finds conditions most to its liking.
Such flexibility may nonetheless be more apparent than real.
In theory, at least, and in fact in some cases, one may close
down a plant and move elsewhere because of what one conceives
to be a hostile attitude on the part of government or labor, or
because of more advantageous manufacturing conditions, i.e.,
unfavorable tax laws, or cheaper labor. Certainly the movement
of the transistor and other electronic industries out of the United
States reflects this ability3 However, the majority of producers,
multinational or not, are restricted by their circumstances. These
circumstances may include the cost of relocation; the lack of a
skilled labor force and the expense of training a new one; the
immobility of substantial fixed assets; or even loyalties developed
over the years. Orders from home offices may be sabotaged as
well as zealously obeyed. Restraints exist.
Nevertheless, many manufacturing enterprises have a degree
of freedom of choice which those tied to natural resources or
national markets may lack. It is such companies which have
excited the majority of complaints. Interestingly enough, these
come from both sides. The host nations argue that their econo-
mies are subject to exploitation for the benefit of the home
nation or "its" corporate bodies. At the same time, at least in the
United States, influential voices in labor and Congress protest
against the export of technology and jobs, against the use of
foreign subsidiaries whose profitability is based on underpaid
labor as export platforms for re-export back to the United States,
and against the establishment of "sister plants" across the Mexi-
can border for assembly and re-import of components back into
the United States with duty paid only on value added abroad.36
Whatever the merit of these arguments, it seems clear that a
subsidiary which has been established abroad to extract ore, or
to manufacture for the local market, or to produce a component
which could as well be produced a thousand miles away (given
equal costs) are three somewhat different kinds of beast. They
Interviews with executives of companies in the "radio, television and communications
equipment and paits" industry sampled in a Commerce Department study resulted in one
company indicating that it established facilities overseas to export to the U.S. due to low
labor costs. "The company faced the dilemma of either producing abroad to ship back to
the United States or losing the market entirely." Gaston, Why Industry Invests Abroad,
Summary of Findings, in THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION, STUDIES IN U.S. FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT, VOL. 2 at 56 (1973).
1 This practice is sanctioned by Item 807.00 of the U.S. Tariff Schedule, 19 U.S.C.
807. For a discussion of this and other issues concerning Item 807.00, see "Comment,"
The Approaching Confrontation over Item 807.00 of the Tariff Schedule, 4 LAW & POL.
INT'L. Bus. 628 (1972). According to Stobaugh, U.S. Multinational Enterprise and the U.S.
Economy, in supra note 35, Vol. 1. relocations under Item 807.00 actually prolong the life
of the company by allowing savings and maintaining competition.
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will have many characteristics in common; but they will also
have essential differences. And, in the analysis of possible inter-
national supervisory schemes, the differences may loom as im-
portant as the similarities.
-B-
The distinction ought also be drawn between issues which are
essentially those of ownership, raised by any private foreign
investment, and those of operations, which are generally limited
to the multinational corporation.
However it is defined, the "multinational enterprise" does not
necessarily require direct foreign ownership. Ownership may well
carry with it the ability to coordinate transnational operations,
and to centralize the decision-making apparatus. But, despite the
convenience of ownership in devising a global strategy for an
integrated group of productive industries located in several na-
tions, the same result may be achieved by agreement between
nominally independent industries. Such agreements may, of
course, cut across the national policies reflected in anti-trust or
similar laws.3 7 But if coordinated transnational activities are the
touchstone of multinationalism in industry, the route of agree-
ment is open within these legal limits, and has often been used.
A classic case which is generally considered to illustrate the con-
flicts involved in this area is that of ICI-Dupont, which involved
a restrictive business arrangement between two otherwise inde-
pendent corporations.35 This case, like the Swiss Watchmakers'
Case,39 is generally cited to suggest the "extraterritorial applica-
tion" of U.S. anti-trust laws.
Though questions of the conduct of multinationals may thus
arise in any case, the ownership of property in a foreign nation
brings to the fore the issue of the rights of the multinational, or,
indeed, of any foreign owner, in the event of a taking of its prop-
erty by the government of the nation in which the property is
37 United States courts have imposed liabilities for conduct outside U.S. borders having an
impact inside the United States, United States v. Aluminum Company, 148 F.2d 416, at 443
(2nd Cir. 1945), see also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) and Pacific
Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied.
393 U.S. 1093 (1969). However, in the area of private international agreements which
conflict with U.S. antitrust laws there are additional considerations relating to substan.
tiality of the domestic effect, international comity, and the ability of U.S. courts to provide
remedies, see W. Fugate, FOREIGN CoMMERc AND TB ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973).
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome have been employed by the European Community
to strike .down, e.g., agreements designed to maintain separate national markets, Grundig-
Consten v. E.E.C. Commission, E.E.C. J.O. 3015 (Sep. 29, 1966) upholding E.E.C. Commis-
sion Grundig-Consten Decision of Sep. 23, 1964, E.E.C. J.O. 2545 (Oct. 10, 1964), or abuse
of dominant position within a substantial part of the Common Market through the acquisi-
tion of control of a Dutch company by a German subsidiary of a U.S. MNC, E.E.C. J.O.
25 (Jan. 8, 1972).
38 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F.Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
105 F.Supp. 215 (1952).
=United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 1963 Trade Cas.
par. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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located. The characteristic controversies here are not those of
transfer pricing or of transfer of technology or allocation of the
cost of research and development, but those over (i) the right of
a state to take property for its own public purposes and (ii) the
concomitant asserted right to prompt, adequate and effective
compensation. One encounters the issues of "creeping expropria-
tion", or the "social purpose" of the Mexican agrarian expropri-
ations of the 1920's and conflicts between rival concepts of in-
ternational law, as for example, over the Calvo Doctrine.
40
Out of this long series of disputes have come the first attempts
to produce a code on foreign investment. In view of current in-
terest in codes designed to regulate the conduct of multinational
corporations, it is well to recall that the early primeval versions4 1
tended to be sponsored by the capital-exporting states, now usu-
ally described as "home" states. The concern of these states was
primarily that there be no unrequited expropriations. Against
such takings they wanted such international protection as they
could obtain for their nationals who held overseas investments.
They were prepared to give general guarantees of "good conduct"
on the part of the investors in return for commitments to some-
thing as close to "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation
as the host nation could be persuaded to accept. The commitment
to fair treatment of the investor, primarily through national and
most-favored-nation treatment in the area of expropriation, was
to be matched by a somewhat vague concession that the investor
should act in a descent manner. Exactly what this latter promise
was to mean was far from clear: it obviously meant that nation-
als of the host nation were not to be denied all managerial oppor-
tunity, but it was far from a commitment that affirmative action
would be taken to give diem such responsibilities. "Just" and
"fair" compensation had a rather explicit significance, as con-
firmed by the exchanges of correspondence between Secretary
of State Hull and the Mexican authorities during the 1930s. 4 2 The
commitments of the investors were less specific, partially because
attention focused more on property than operational issues.
One of the first attempts to secure a "code" was that of Arti-
cles 11 and 12 of the abortive Charter of the International Trade
Organization,' 3 suggested in 1947 by capital-exporting states, in-
cluding the United States, as a desirable and necessary addition
to a charter to establish a world trade organization. After those
articles, which were probably as good as any subsequently writ-
40 On the exchange of notes concerning compensation for Mexican expropriations, see 3
HACKWORTH 655 (1942).
4, Supra notes 28, 29 & 30.
4"Supra note 40.
45 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PUB. No. 3206, HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ORGANIZATION (1948).
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ten, proved unacceptable to both capital-exporting and capital-
importing countries, several attempts at producing codes were
made.4 Once again, these were on the part of those primarily
concerned with protecting the investor. These have already been
mentioned above.4 5 Their chief result would seem to have been
to convince a number of states in the southern hemisphere that,
if the content of the codes could be swung 1800 around, such
codes might be desirable. The Charter of The Economic Rights
and Duties of States and, even more, the unfortunately increas-
ing atmosphere of confrontation, are perhaps the result. 6 If this
is an accurate provenance, then one may well regret that this
Pandora's Box was ever opened.
Foreign ownership, particularly of natural resources, involves
psychological and political, as well as obvious economic, issues.
Until recently, the investors, especially those from the U.S., have
tended to regard the issues as if they were solely economic. To
"populist" complaints of foreign domination and of violations of
national sovereignty, it has generally been thought sufficient to
respond with analyses of the economic benefits of foreign invest-
ment, of the transfers of technology which have been achieved
and of the contributions of capital and skills which have resulted.
The main concession to national resentments has generally been
advice to overseas investors that they maintain a low profile,
employ local nationals in managerial positions where possible and
to otherwise seek to mollify the natives. It is only recently, with
the advent of the possibility of substantial new inflows of capital
to the U.S. economy, especially in takeover situations, that the
U.S., and particularly the Congress, has come to appreciate the
depth of emotion felt, for example, by Canadians contemplating
the overwhelming presence of U.S. investment in vital sectors of
Canadian industry?
7
There is, clearly, a certain amount of exaggeration in equating
foreign ownership with foreign control. Ownership does not nec-
essarily mean control. During World War II, German-owned firms
located in the U.S. produced for the U.S. war effort, just as U.S.
subsidiaries in Germany provided essential products to the
Wehrmacht. To cite a possibility which has recently excited much
comment, if Arab "petrodollars" were to acquire a substantial
interest in Pennsylvania coal mining, it is unlikely that the in-
vestors would want managerial control, or, in that unlikely event,
would be permitted to exercise their rights of ownership in a
manner thought to be prejudicial to U.S. interests. Nevertheless,
44 Supra notes 29 & 30.4 5 Supra note 31.46Supra note 19.
47 See Comment, The Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act: Red. White and Grey.
5 LAW & POL. INT'L BUS. 1018 (1973).
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
discomfort is felt, primarily in regard to specific industries, such
as, for example, acquisition of communications facilities, such
as newspapers. The spate of bills now being considered by Con-
gress, especially Senator Inouye's proposal to review the extent
of foreign investment in the U.S. in detail, testifies to this dis-
comfort.4t Understanding of this kind of discomfort abroad is
thus beginning to appear in the United States.
The degree of unease is intensified if foreign ownership is
concentrated in certain "vital" industries, though Hawaiian con-
cern over Japanese acquisition of local resort and recreation fa-
cilities seems extreme."' Chairman Burns of the Federal Reserve
Board stated that he would not be bothered by foreign invest-
ment in Quaker Oats, but "it would concern me" if the oil-
producing nations invested in "strategic" industries.5o Notably,
Mr. Burns' definition of "strategic" was not stated; it could be
very broad.
Ownership also implies what economists call "rents." These
benefits of ownership are usually considered to perform an im-
portant economic function in the process of allocating and con-
serving resources. But with rents goes the problem of unequal
income distribution, both within a nation and internationally.
One substantial complaint of the developing countries, thus, is
that the allocation of "rents," being rooted in history rather than
in justice, heavily favors the "old rich" and that it widens dis-
parities among classes as well as among nations. An exacerbating
aspect of the dispute is the divergence on a proper allocation
between those possessing technology and management and those
possessing natural resources, as well as the appropriate relation
between prices of raw materials and of manufactured goods.
Implicit in all this are such issues as the relative merits of equity
versus debt investment: the "perpetual" charge of profit versus
the fixed commitment implied in debt financing. The perceived
disadvantages which seem to inhere in ownership are largely the
source of the impulse toward alternative formulae, such as "fade-
out" divestment requirements, which have commended them-
selves to certain Latin American nations.
2 The Inouye-Culver legislation, the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-
479, 88 Stat. 1450, which entered into force Oct. 26, 1974, is designed to provide information
on foreign direct and portfolio investment into the U.S. through studies undertaken by the
Departments of Commerce and Treasury. An interim report will be submitted to Congress
before the en d of 1975. Several pieces of legislation which would establish a major degree
f regulation and control of foreign investment have been introduced in the 94th Congress,
1 t Ses.ion: c.p., S. 329, to provide continuous monitoring of investment into the U.S. by
requiring the reporting if acquisitions of stock in U.S. corporations resulting in 5c,, or
greater foreign control, H.R. 411 & H.R. 945. to establish an agency to control or prohibit
foreign investment in areas deemed to be vital to U.S. economic security or national de-
fense, or S. 425, to require notification by foreign investors of proposed acquisitions of
equity securities of U.S. corporations and to allow the President to block any such acquisi-
tion for national security, foreign policy or domestic economic reasons,
0 Durdin, Coierii of Hawaiians Waning orrr Jiivestmient by .Jaiis'. N Y. Times. Mar.
2, 1974, at 43, col. 1.
" N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
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In an analysis of possible international regulatory or super-
visory mechanisms, there might also be scrutiny of what is in
fact (to the extent ascertainable) the power of the multinational
enterprise. To what extent does it really threaten national sov-
ereignty, or limit the ability of nations to enact and implement
programs for their own better economic and social develop-
ment?51
There is little doubt that situations arise in which there is real
conflict between the multinationals and nation-states. Statistics
abound as to the extent of the business done by multinationals:
the gross annual sales volume of some exceeds the gross national
product of many nationsA 2 Such size suggests, if it does not
prove, power. Here it is worth noting that, although the power
of multinationals has generally been equated with their ability
to take affirmative actions, the effect of not acting, of abstaining
from doing business in or with a nation-state, is also likely to
have its effect. As already noted, there are important limitations
on the asserted power of the multinationals and other constraints
on their scope of decision. Moreover, in many situations, it is not
the multinational which is in conflict with those states who most
frequently make the charge, the host states. Often, the conflict is
between the host state and the home state. Thus, if U.S. or Euro-
pean community antitrust policy is applied by U.S. or EEC
courts in a way which conflicts with the policy of other nations,
the matter is one which concerns national policies, and is hardly
an example of conflict between the multinational and the nation-
state. The ICI-Dupont case is a good example. 33 Another is the
directive given to multinationals by the U.S. in early 1969, de-
signed to lead to the remission of foreign earnings to the U.S. in
connection with the Foreign Direct Investment controls: a step
leading to a possible easing of U.S. balance of payments diffi-
culties, to the likely detriment of the balance of payments of
other nations.4 In such circumstances, the multinational would
prefer to receive instructions from no state, home or host. It is
an instrument of possibly conflicting national policies, not a
creator of policy.
In some circumstances, the ability of multinationals to circum-
vent national policies exists, and is, no doubt, utilized. However,
5"See R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTER-
PRISES (1971) and R. EELLS, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS: THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF WORLD
ECONOMIC POWER (1972).
2 Supra note 2.
3 Sup'a note 38.
"See Exec. Order 11387, 3 C.F.R. 192 (1974), 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1970), the Foreign Direct
Investment Regulations of January 1968. This program has been abandoned by the United
States; however, its relatively brief life is a vivid reminder of possibilities not entirely
palatable to host nations, developed and developing.
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there are likely limitations on this ability. Much depends upon
the type of business done by the multinational. A company en-
gaged in extraction must operate where oil or minerals exist,
though it may have the flexibility of alternative sources of sup-
ply or of alternative products. The range of choice may broaden
or narrow. At one time, when tin prices rose, plastics became a
threat to tin producers. The new price of oil has removed that
possibility. A company which has found itself compelled by the
economics of a market situation to manufacture within that mar-
ket, for whatever reason, is largely without alternatives, if it
chooses to remain in business. Even the "true multinational"
which produces in many alternative sites and can shift production
in whole or in part as its convenience dictates, may find that its
freedom to make managerial or production decisions is limited.
Capital investment is not easily moved, nor lightly abandoned.
Long-term considerations may inhibit short-term advantageous
actions. Identification by the managers of local producing units
with the interests of the nation within which they live and work
may exercise a powerful, if informal, restraint.
Moreover, transnational business enterprises have found in re-
cent years a growing web of regulatory rules in home and host
nations alike. For example, one of the traditional MNE-nation-
state conflicts has been in the area of transfer pricing. Undoubt-
edly with some justice, charges of artificial transfer pricing have
been made. But the present close scrutiny being given to transfer
prices in the United States under § 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code, the attention being given by home and host nations to tax
avoidance through artificial transfer prices and through taking
profits in tax havens rather than in the producing or the con-
suming nation, and the increasing sophistication of host, or
importing, nations have severely constrained the multinationals
in this important area. 5 Corporations in the extractive industries
are no longer likely to be able to operate with unrestrained free-
dom to reduce production in certain countries in order to maxi-
mize more profitable production elsewhere.
The flexibility of the multinational, and its consequent ability
to circumvent the limitations of entirely national enterprises, is
not completely gone. If alternative facilities of production are
5 Transfer pricing refers to the prices charged for goods and services within the MNC.
The MNC may set transfer prices so as to shift income to low-tax countries or minimize
profit in a country in which pressures for price reduction or higher wages are felt. Low
transfer prices may be used to minimize the duty base on goods transferred to high-tariff
countries, or, in the case of a new subsidiary, to provide startup financing. See Shulman.
When the Price is Wrong by Design, 2 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 69 (1967). Recent studies sug-
gest that transfer pricing is no longer widely used by MNCs operating in Europe and
North America; see M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS, THE STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISE 176 (1970) and J. ARPAN, INTERNATIONAL INTRACORPORATE PRICING: NON-AMERICAN
SYSTEMS AND VIEws (1972).
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available, the multinational may by-pass a troublesome nation
and manufacture elsewhere. A strike in Britain may result in
transfer of production of the same item to Belgium; if wage
rates rise in Japan, transistors may be produced in Taiwan, and
so forth. But the scope is steadily being narrowed.
Host nation restraints have, in recent years, been particularly
noticeable. The OPEC nations have demonstrated their power
over the multinationals as well as their ability to fix prices and
production quotas and to maintain an effective cartel. They seem
to be about to move downstream toward substantial control over
both transport and refining. Venezuela has nationalized other
natural resources, such as iron ore.5 6 Licensing agreements have
been brought under national control. Mexico, Argentina and the
Andean Group have measures which affect not only entry but
operations and eventual divestment. 57 Affirmative measures have
been enacted to supplement these restraints. The Canadian De-
velopment Corporation seeks both to acquire control of the opera-
tions of substantial Canadian enterprises, such as the Texas Gulf
Corporation, and to encourage and favor industrial projects
owned by Canadian nationals. The Andean Development Corpo-
ration, and favorable tariff treatment for Andean-controlled and
owned enterprises, are two kinds of affirmative measures, simi-
lar in both their objectives and their effects.
No less significant are the controls being considered and some-
times imposed by the home nations. It still seems unlikely that
the web of restrictive legislation encompassed in the Hartke-
Burke proposals will be enacted. 58 Especially is this so in the
light of the passage of the Trade Reform Act of 1974. 59 The ef-
fects of that act are doubtful; but that its intended thrust is in
the direction of trade expansion, not restriction, is clear. None-
theless, the Act makes escape clause actions much easier than
was previously the case,60 and contains many clauses which re-
flect the concern of the United States with the asserted loss of
jobs via establishment of production abroad." Nonetheless,
W N.Y. Times, May 31, 1974, at 50, col. 3.
57 See supra note 14; Lacy & Garza, Mexico - Are the Rules Really Changing? 7 INT'L
LAW. 560 (1973); and "Note," Argentine Foreign Investment Incentives: Quixotic Nation-
alism Challenges the Windfall, 12 VA. J. INT'L LAW 240 (1972).
58 The Hartke-Burke legislation, most recently, The Foreign Trade and Investment Act of
1973, S. 161, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess., would, inter aeia. impose substantial controls on U.S.
imports, relax injury standards for escape clause relief and eliminate discretionary Presi-
dential authority to grant such quota or tariff relief, allow the President to prohibit trans-
fers of capital out of the U.S. if they would cause a decrease in employment in the U.S.,
authorize the President to prevent a U.S.-patent holder from licensing or producing abroad,
and would substantially increase U.S. taxation of foreign source income. In support of these
proposals, see Testimony of Sen. Vance Hartke, Hearings on H.R. 10710 Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 1414-1486 (1974); for the opposing view, see Tes-
timony of Donald Kendall App. A, Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 675-684 (1973).
59 Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1978.
w Id., § 201, 88 Stat. 2011, repealing Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 1 301, 76 Stat. 883.
11 Trade Act of 1974, § 283, 88 Stat. 2041.
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American labor's denunciation of such provisions as § 807.00 of
the United States Tariff Schedule, which is the basis and the
rationale of the "border industries," has not resulted in its aboli-
tion in the Trade Bill; data seem to indicate that the multina-
tionals with foreign production facilities have increased, not lost,
jobs for American labor.', - But general public and Congressional
concern is evident; the decisions of multinationals to go abroad
rather than produce at home will have to take this concern, and
its possible consequences, into account. Again, the scope of poten-
tial investment decisions for the multinational has been narrowed
by considerations such as these. At the least, an additional in-
hibiting factor will have to be factored into the business decision.
Other measures have likewise constrained previous freedoms; for
example, as. the unhappy situation of Compania Swift de la Plata
indicates, Argentina will hold the assets of one subsidiary of a
multinational responsible for the asserted debts of another un-
related (except by common ownership) subsidiary.
It seems likely, moreover, that the basic circumstances which
fostered the growth of the multinational have changed. Though
there still exists the factor of the economies of scale and the
accompanying efficiencies of the multinational, extrapolation on
a straight line of the history of the 1950's and the 1960's seems
unlikely. In those years, the chief expansion abroad was that of
the American-based multinational. It had the advantage of a
world reserve currency, undoubtedly so over-valued as to make
acquisitions abroad a bargain in financial or business terms. It
broke into the European Common Market at a time when Euro-
pean companies were still too small, too timid, too concerned with
cartels rather than expansion, and too unimaginative to take
advantage of the opportunities, financial and industrial, which
lay before them. Now, and for the period since the end of 1971,
this situation has changed. Expansion may continue but not at
the bargain rate of the earlier halcyon period. And, at least in
the short-tern, the world-wide decline of profits of industrial
concerns will provide its own set of limitations. 3
It must also be remembered that statistics with respect to the
enormous growth of overseas business, whether American, Jap-
anese, or European-based, show the bulk of the expansion has
been from one developed nation to another.6 4 Entry of the multi-
national into the developing nations was slowing down even
-Stobaugh et at.. U.S. Multinational Enterprises and the U.S. Economy, in THE MI,.TI-
NATIONAL CORPORATION: STUDIES ON U.S. FOREIGN INVESTMENT, VOL. 1 30-31 (U.S. Depart-
rnent of Commerce 1972).
.See Rubin. The Multinational Enterprise at Bay, 68 AM. J. INT'L LAW 475 (1974).
"See R. VERNON, supra note 51. at 19, and Vernon. Multinational Enterprise and Na-
tional Security (Adelphi Papers No. 74, 1971) in VERNON, T11E ECONOMIC AND POLITICAI
CONSEQUENCES OF MULTINATIONAL. ENTERPRISE: AN ANTHOLOGY 127 (1972).
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
before the current manifestations of concern. The regulatory
suggestions now being considered, in at least some instances, may
well be anachronistic before they are enacted.
On all sides, therefore, the multinational faces new constraints
and new circumstances. It is against this present situation-not
the often asserted and the somewhat anecdotal history of past
abuses6-that any present program of international supervision
or regulation must be judged.
II.
Proposals for regional, national, or international "supervision
or regulation" abound.
-A-
A first group of such proposals concerns attempts to regulate
the conduct of multinationals. Early essays in this direction were
primarily oriented toward protection of the asserted rights of
private foreign investors. They range from the provisions of the
ITO Charter, to proposals of the private organizations like the
National Foreign Trade Council, or the OECD, and they have
uniformly foundered. Recent attempts sponsored by capital ex-
porters (the "home" nations) have had more limited objectives.
The November, 1974 proposal of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of
the Federal Republic of Germany has thus been the suggestion
of "an international standard of behavior to which the multina-
tionals should adhere," to be worked out, at least in the first
instance, on a German-American basis. Later, the Chancellor
apparently suggested, it could be a model "for adoption and ap-
plication on a world-wide scale." 6
Other proposals of this type have been made in the recent past.
The International Chamber of Commerce has issued suggested
guidelines of conduct for multinationals' 7 The ICC standards,
while unexceptional, lack the specificity which would seem neces-
sary to make them meaningful. Chancellor Schmidt's concern
was apparently fueled by the "recurring charges (in Germany)
that the multinational oil companies used the dislocations of last
winter's oil embargo to distribute their sales among various na-
tional subsidiaries in a way that enables them to make maximum
1' It is clear that private foreign investors and/or transnational corporations have been
guilty of many abuses of law and property. The recent (March, 1975) revelations of the
acts of United Brands in Honduras indicate a course of conduct in which ethics, to say the
best, have been subordinated to the supposed dictates of practicality. See Editorial. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 29. 1975, at 32, col. 1. So also the disclosures of bribes paid by Gulf Oil Cor-
poration, despite the "when in Rome" defense, have demonstrated the relevance of current
demands (in the OECD no less than the United Nations) for better, more uniform, and
more available information of a technical, financial, and accounting nature. Availability of
such information may do more than formal agreements to improve conduct - on both sides.
" Wash. Post, Nov. 28. 1974, at C20. col. 1.
67 ICC, GuIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL IN E TMENT (Brochure No. 272, 1972).
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profits while paying minimum taxes."68 Little, if anything, in the
ICC suggestions would affect company decisions of this sort. An-
other issue lying behind the German suggestions arose from the
challenge posed by the American Chamber of Commerce in Ger-
many to proposed legislation which would increase the voice of
German labor in corporate decision-making. 69
"Intervention" is also an issue of intractable complexity. The
Inter-American Juridical Committee, for example, has adopted
and recommended to the Council of the Organization of Ameri-
can States a "List of Cases of Violation of the Principle of
Non-intervention."7 While that list is directed mainly at govern-
mental rather than corporate acts, it clearly implies the impro-
priety of attempts by business enterprises to influence national
legislation. Precisely how the distinction is to be made between
legitimate expressions of concern to a government whose pro-
posed regulations would seriously affect the viability of a business
enterprise and those which are an unwarranted interference is
not stated. What one side perceives to be an unacceptable inter-
vention may, to the other, be an expression of concern which a
producing or distributing company is fully justified in making.
Another exercise in this direction has been underway in Wash-
ington, under the aegis of a Working Group of the meeting of
Foreign Ministers of the American republics. The origins of this
effort lie in the suggestion of Secretary of State Kissinger that
a fact-finding mechanism be established, which might, by an im-
partial process, develop agreed statements of fact in investment
or multinational enterprise disputes.7'1 That suggestion met a
frigid Latin American reception. It was altered to a proposal that
"principles of conduct" be drafted.7 2 "Principles" were thought to
be something less than enforceable standards-more guidelines
than a code. Nonetheless, the meetings to date have not demon-
"s Supra note 66.
"The proposed legislation to increase labor co-determination (Mitbestimmung), still not
enacted, would further expand the voice of labor on West German corporate supervisory
boards and boards of management. Firms incorporated in Germany but owned by U.S.
MNCs would not receive special treatment. The United States Chamber of Commerce in
Germany has suggested that the proposed legislation possibly conflicts with the MFN clause
of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany, Oct 29, 1954. (1956] 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593. On
the Chamber of Commerce reaction, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 13. 1974, at 17, col. 1, and DR
SPIEaEL, Oct. 14. 1974, at 28. On co-determination, see Meissel & Fogel, Co-determination in
Germany: Labor's Participation in Management, 9 INT'L LAW. 182 (1975).
TO Work Accomplished by the Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 7, at 3-4
& 135-136.
:' See Statement of Secretary Kissinger at the Conference of Tlatelolco, Mexico City, Feb.
21, 1974: . . . we might consider the establishment of a working group to examine various
procedures for factfinding. conciliation, or the settlement of disputes." Dept. of State Press
Release No. 62. 70 DEP'T OF STATE BUL. 257, 260 (1974).
72Secretary of State Kissinger proposed the adoption of "prineipl'" to the Meetiniz rf
the Foreign Ministers of the Americas. April 17 & 18, 1974, in Washington, D.C., and on
April 20, 1974 lauded the joint efforts before the OAS General Assembly in Atlanta, Ga.:
"Our new dialogue has already been marked by substantial progress . . . - We have estab-
lished a working group to develop principles for the conduct of transnational enterprises."
70 DEP'T OF STATE BUL. 510-515, 511 (1974).
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strated that the task is made the easier by softening the lan-
guage. The lesson of the ITO charter still seems relevant; princi-
ples, codes or guidelines are either so general as to be useless or
so specific as to be unacceptable. With the current effort in the
same direction in the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corpo-
rations, it seems likely that these inter-American discussions will
remain suspended.
Finally, the difficulty of negotiating a code acceptable to
investor and to host nation is vividly illustrated by the U.N.
Charter on the Rights and Duties of States, adopted December
14, 1974, by the General Assembly. In a somewhat unusual action,
especially in the light of earlier words of at least guarded praise
for the endeavor, the United States and five other nations voted
against the Charter in the General Assembly.73 A crucial point
was Article 2 of Chapter II, which would seem to permit expro-
priation in accordance with national law. In that Chapter, the
majority rejected a proposed amendment, which inter alia con-
tained a commitment to carry out international obligations.4 The
Charter's approval of producer cartels, but not of consumer na-
tion combinations, was an additional factor behind the U.S. vote. 5
The experience with the Charter on the Rights and Duties of
States clearly demonstrates the present problems with drafting
any code or similar document which will be acceptable to inves-
tors and developing nations alike.
Nevertheless, the first meeting of the United Nations Commis-
sion on Transnational Corporations, pursuant to its mandate,
gave high priority to the drafting of a code. The Commission
was created by ECOSOC Resolution 1913 (LVII) of December 11,
1974, which requested the Commission to develop a program of
work including, as a priority item, "preliminary work with the
objective of formulating a code of conduct." One of the "areas of
concern" put forward by the Group of 77 (actually now 100 de-
veloping nations) was "the refusal of transnational corporations
to accept the exclusive jurisdiction of domestic law in the question
of compensation or nationalization." ' A considerable amount of
debate was on whether such a code would be directed solely to
transnational corporations, or would include consideration of host
.3 Supra note 17.
"4 The amendment also stated a right of a State '... to nationalize, expropriate or requi-
sition foreign property for a. public purpose, provided that just compeusation in the light
of all relevant circumstances shall be paid [italics added]." It should be noted that Chapter
I of the Charter, under the heading of "'Fundamentals of International Ecunomic Relations,"
states that relations shall be governed by several principles, among which is "M() Fulfill-
ment in good faith of international obligations."
Article 5: "All states have the right to associate in organizations of primary commodity
producers in order to develop their national economies . . . Correspondingly, all states have
the duty to respect that right by refraining from applying economic and political measure-
that would limit it."
-6 See U.N. Press Release, ECOSOC/3722 (March 28, 1975).
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nation legislation or actions affecting such corporations. Thus,
Article 3 (III) of the proposed report of the Commission showed
disagreement as to whether such a code was "to be observed by
transnational corporations" or was to be described as "dealing
with transnational corporations. '
'
1
7
It seems more likely that, at least in the next few years, a
fully acceptable "Code" may first be worked at between nations
of a comparable degree of development. Despite difficulties, thus,
there would seem to be little reason why a code limited to OECD
members could not be negotiated. Some parts of such a "code"
already exist in fact, as in the OECD Code of Liberalization of
Capital Movements.
How necessary an investment code is, as between such states,
continues to be doubtful. Thus, Canada, in which American in-
vestment is enormous by any standards, absolute or relative, has
no treaty arrangements with respect to fair treatment with the
United States. The absence of a Canadian-U.S. Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation over the past thirty years has
not noticeably cooled American enthusiasm for investing in
Canada. Where a code is not necessary, it may perhaps be
obtained. But even in such a situation, negotiation of its clauses
might well raise issues which had better be left dormant.
The fact would seem to be that the negotiation of investment
codes or codes of conduct for or dealing with transnational cor-
porations, is often more troublesome than are the actual invest-
ments. The clear outlines of disagreement, for example, between
Mexico and the United States have existed on principle at least
since the diplomatic exchanges of 1938.71 Nonetheless, a great
deal of United States and other foreign private investment has
gone into Mexico since 1938, with generally favorable results on
both sides. Perhaps here, as in more exalted matters, "the letter
killeth, but the spirit maketh live."
-B-
Other techniques for avoidance of difficulties lie in the possi-
bility of purely national action, especially by the capital-export-
ing nations. It has been suggested, for example, that some sort of
screening mechanism might be used by a capital-exporting coun-
try under which it would examine investment proposals, warn
investors of possible difficulties, possibly suggest alternative
methods of investment, and state its intention to support such
an investor with representations to the host nation only in the
case of approved investments. Alternatively, no presumption of
7 7 U.N. Doe. E/C. 10/L.I/Add. 2 (March 27, 1975).
'8 Supra note 40.
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governmental support would exist in the case of non-approved
investments. The experience of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) is cited in support of this technique.79 OPIC
insures investments abroad only in special cases in which they
conform to developmental criteria, however broadly conceived,
and when there is some agreement (often an exchange of letters)
between the United States and the host country.80 Investments
likely to cause difficulties-for reasons of unreliability of the
investor, low probability of success of the enterprise, or lack of
developmental contribution, in the opinion of OPIC-are there-
fore not insured. And if commitment of the investment depends
upon securing OPIC insurance, the investment is not made.
It has been suggested by some Congressional critics that OPIC
is undesirable, since it makes certain that, in the case of an
expropriation which is sooner or later not followed by just com-
pensation, there will be a government-to-government confronta-
tion, and it may lessen the pressure on the investor to work out
his own problems. 81 In the screening process, however, much can
be done to avoid the likelihood of host government action against
the investor. OPIC screening undoubtedly eliminates many
investments which might well be the cause of later friction.
Continuation of OPIC has seemed to Congress, after full consid-
eration, to be desirable. But the re-authorization of OPICs2 hardly
answers the basic question: whether an investor who has not
been approved by some sort of governmental screening apparatus,
whether or not he has applied for investment insurance, should
be in a category other than that of the investor who has put
himself through the meshes of that screen.
The affirmative answer would, of course, reduce cases of con-
frontation. The cost would be, however, a substantial increase in
bureaucratic influence, if not control, over private investment
decisions. Moreover, though the criticism that investment insur-
ance automatically involves the government in an essentially
private investment decision would not necessarily apply, the
process of pre-consultation and clearance would certainly increase
the presumption of government involvement in the event of diffi-
culties. And that presumption would be present in all screened
cases, even where there would be no bilateral agreement as a
pre-condition for investment insurance presupposing an initially
kindly view on the part of the host nation. On the other hand, it
n The suggestion is that of Herbert Salzman, former Executive Vice President of OPIC,
which he made in a paper presented to the American Assembly of Columbia University in
December, 1974, reprinted as How to Reduce and Manage the Political Risks of Investment
in Less Developed Countries, in supra note 33, pp. 85-110.
go OPIC, INCENTIVE HANDBOOK FOR INVESTMENT INSURANCE 5 & 9 (undated).
61 See S. Rep. No. 93-676, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
8. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1974, 85 Stat. 763,
amending 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200a.
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can be argued that, even now, the presumption is that the home
government will intervene to protect its investor in case of unfair
treatment abroad. The screening process might be such that it
would merely shift that presumption of future protection so as
to place such a burden upon the investor. Nonetheless, it seems
unlikely that the techniques used in the limited case of
application for investment insurance, where government officials
examine the project and its feasibility, would produce benefits
outweighing difficulties if extended on a limited or global basis.
That the government of the investor should be "in on the take-
offs if it is to be called upon to help in the case of crashes" has
a tempting but illusory attraction.
On the capital importing side, there are of course other tech-
niques which would help in avoiding investment disputes. All
agree that it would be useful for such nations to state ground
rules-letting the investor know in advance what is expected of
him. This has largely been done, in such regulations as Decision
24 of the Andean Group,"' though that applies to existing as well
as prospective investment. Where it can be accomplished, the
technique is beneficial. Although there has been discontent with
application of Mexican rules in this respect and investors on both
sides often avoid if not evade such regulations, they seem to
work adequately. 4 As in the case of the screening mechanism
mentioned above, prospective application would, of course, not
affect the vast amount of existing foreign investment.
-C-
Other variations of national or international rule-making exist.
It has been often suggested, for example, that an international
"charter" for multinational companies-an International Com-
panies Law, under which multinational corporations would be
incorporated, would help.65 It seems unlikely that such a proposal
could have anything but limited application. Even within the
reasonably homogenous bounds of the European Economic
Community, the proposed EC Companies Law has had a long
and still uncertain history.5 8 It apparently still founders on the
83 Supra note 14.
84 Supra note 57; see Should Investment Capital Stay Home? A Mexican-U.S. Dialogue in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 68TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL.
LAw 58-75 (1975).
' See supra note 21, Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being Stateless, COL. J WORLD
Bus. (1967), and Rubin, The International Firm and National Jurisdiction. in THE INTER-
NATIONAL CORPORATION 179 (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970).
So EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY COUNCIL, Proposition de Reglement (CEE' du Counseil
Portant Statut de Ia Societe Anonyme Europeene, E.E.C. J.O. C124 (Oct. 10. 1970). Th.
EC statute creating the European Company is designed to aid international mergers within
the EC' and thereby enable European firms to better compete with giant U.S. MNCs. See
Van Gerven, Sone Recent Developments in C'orporate Law within the Common Market.
6 INT'L LAW. 494 '1972). and C heris & Fischer The European Company. Its Promise and
Problems. 6 STAN. -f NV', STUD. 113 t971t.
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principle of Mitbestimmung-worker co-determination . 7 Even if
it were to overcome that obstacle, it is difficult to see what effect
it would have other than to smooth the path of unification via
Community-wide companies. To the extent that it had this result,
it would be a force in a direction contrary to that desired by the
developing nations. They desire not to facilitate the already-
substantial ability of the multinational corporation to ignore
national boundaries, but to restrict that possibility. Also, the
inclusion of the substantive aspects of many regulatory statutes
(such as those on antitrust) in a law designed to provide the
formal structure for a corporation is hardly feasible.
The Report of the U.N. Group of Eminent Persons, despite the
questions of doctrine which it raises and the dissents which it
engendered, offers some clue to more useful action. On the one
side, it emphasizes the importance of information. On the other,
it sets up a Commission, one of the duties of which is the ulti-
mate development of a code of conduct,ss on which subject some-
thing has been said supra.
On the first point, it seems useful to obtain so much informa-
tion as is relevant. Statistics abound, but there are lacunae. If
care be exercised to respect the legitimate needs of business
confidentiality, if the penchant of all bureaucracies to compile
endless files of statistics is not indulged, and if-and here
doubts arise-statistical material of any reliability is in fact
available from more than a handful of nations, the compilation
of the figures may serve a useful and sobering function.
As to the Commission itself, its usefulness depends upon its
ability to produce discussion rather than confrontation. The
first session demonstrated the possibility of representatives
talking at, rather than with, one another, though basic agree-
ment on a work program was attained. It would probably have
been useful, even from the viewpoint of the developing nations,
if the Commission had been given a larger representation from
the capital exporting, the "home" nations. There is a very real
mutuality of interest in increasing the contribution of those
aggregations of capital and skills called transnational corpora-
tions to the development process. This is especially so in a world
of growing needs and limited resources, which includes manage-
8- Mitbeatimmung, supra note 69, is only present in the EC on a national level and only
in the German Federal Republic and The Netherlands. Other EC members generally do not
wish to have Mitbestimmung applied to the European Company, while the German govern-
ment is fearful that without it German firms would use the European Company to evade
German labor co-determination requirements.
I The Eminent Persons Report recommends that the Commission on Multinational Cor-
porations prepare and submit to the ECOSOC a code of conduct for MNCs. It would be
"not compulsory in character" but would "act as an instrument of moral persuasion."
Stpra, note 22, at 54-55.
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ment and technology, as well as raw materials. The debate on
the words of a code is unfortunately likely to be divisive; what
must be perceived is the underlying identity of interest, and a
willingness to subordinate rhetoric to realities.
What can be useful would be a center in which calm work on
a regular basis can be done. One hopes that the Commission and
the Information and Research Center will be this. With a
coherent and initially modest work program, much might be
accomplished. On a step-by-step basis, specific arrangements
on particular and discrete problems could be made. For ex-
ample, the asserted extensions of law on an extraterritorial
basis seem susceptible to reasonable solution. Questions of taxa-
tion, and particularly use of tax havens to avoid national taxa-
tion, are other issues which have sufficient common interest to
make solutions possible. Standards in regard to transfer pricing
might be produced. The useful work already done by the Secre-
tariat, particularly the Chudson and Wells report,9 is an ex-
cellent example of the kind of factual study which the Com-
mission might sponsor. The same may be said of the Technical
Paper on Taxation.9 0 However, to continue and extend this kind
of work which produces light rather than heat, it will be neces-
sary to orient the Commission toward consensus, and to empha-
size work rather than polemics. A dangerous fact is that, in
seeking to regulate--on both sides--dimly known and specula-
tive future dangers, a "code" polarizes. Perhaps at this ad-
vanced stage, in the interest of all, the danger can be avoided.
Perhaps the experience of the inter-American system indi-
cates that confrontation can in fact be minimized if not entirely
eliminated. In a sense, the inter-American system has lived
with the problems of private foreign investment and multi-
national corporations for a great many years, including disputes,
expropriations and settlements, and has managed, in many in-
stances, to allow the work to go on behind a sometimes heavy
cloud of words. Neither side will accept the principles of the
other: "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" as op-
posed to "permanent sovereignty over natural resources" coupled
with the Calvo Doctrine. But in practice, just as the speeches in
the U.N. General Assembly tend to be more extreme than those
made in capitols, the reiteration of principles with theological
fervor does not seem incompatible with compromise by both
sides. The compromises may be somewhat ambiguous, and
8 The Acquisition of Technology from Multinational Corporations by Developing Countries.
U.N. Doe. ST/ESA/12 (1974).
0 The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Rela-
tions, Technical Papers: Taxation, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/11 (1974).
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achievement of them is sometimes tedious, but, in general, they
work.
And various devices can be used to assist in operational co-
operation, free of the dogma of either side. Examples are the
Development Center of the OECD, and a suggested inter-
American informational center, which would possibly provide
prospective host countries and prospective investors with a
meeting ground. 91
In view of the obvious interest of Canada in the hemisphere,
and the increasing amount of investment from Europe and
Japan in Latin America, arrangements within the structure of
the Organization of American States will, no less than those of
the OECD, be outward looking. It is possible that other regional
groupings, in Asia and Africa, may follow suit.
Whatever may be done, it is clear that no simple formula, nor
any simplistic viewpoint, will be adequate. Realities impose
themselves on decreed solutions. There is a trade-off between
regulation and the benefits of the multinationals. The costs of
doctrinaire restriction must be paid, in one way or another,
whether in trade or investment. Achieving social objectives may
require recognition of legitimate costs, just as the multinationals
must recognize the importance to host nations of participation
as well as the benefits of efficiency. Above all, it must be acknowl-
edged that the relationship of the nation-state and the multi-
national is a dynamic, not a static, one. Labor costs and efficien-
cies change both from place to place and as new developments
evolve. The American company which established its plant in
Japan a few years ago is already relocating, sometimes back to
the United States. The United States, a nation which has
characteristically opposed controls on foreign investment, has
enacted limitations on foreign direct investment, and is in the
midst of a national re-examination of the effects of investment
into the United States. Solutions which for a time seemed viable
have been found wanting; for example, variable exchange rates,
which seemed to provide solutions to many issues, are no longer
regarded as effective in a world in which much trade is carried
on between units of the same enterprise, and forward currency
transactions of multinationals, sometimes argued to have ac-
centuated undesirable currency speculations, have given rise to
suggestions of an international central bank.92
91 S. J. RuBiN, G. B. MEEKER & R. LumiEs, A CENTER FOR CAPITAL MARKET COOPERA-
TION: PPORT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CAPITAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENT
PROmRAM, OAS Doc. OAS/Ser.H./14 (1973).
"Rostow, The Multinational Corporation and the Future of the World Economy. in suprp
note 33, at 119.
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The complications are everywhere and the changes are rapid
and persuasive. The only certainty is that no one party is to
blame, no nation is blameless, and predictions are risky. Given
the importance of the stakes for developed and developing
nations alike, what is required in such circumstances is the
development of structures within which the painful, but some-
how exhilarating, process of searching for solutions can be
carried forward.

